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Abstract 
 
 
We present and test empirically a new theory of property and contract rights.  Any 
incentive an autocrat has to respect such rights comes from his interest in future tax collections and 
national income and increases with his planning horizon.  We find  a compelling empirical 
relationship between property and contract rights and an autocrat's time in power.  In lasting -- but 
not in new -- democracies, the same rule of law and individual rights that ensure continued free 
elections entail extensive property and contract rights.  We show that the age of a democratic 
system is strongly correlated with property and contract rights. 
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1. Introduction 
What types of governments are most likely to have economic policies and institutions that 
generate good economic performance?  There are examples of good -- and of bad -- economic 
performance under both autocratic and democratic governments.  Many empirical studies have 
compared the economic performance of autocracies and democracies, but their conclusions are 
remarkably varied and inconclusive.  We shall show here that it is naive to suppose that one of 
these types of political systems will regularly have better economic performance than the other. 
The quality of economic policies and institutions depends partly on the incentives and 
constraints that face those who make governmental and legal decisions.  These incentives and 
constraints vary from one autocracy to another and from one democracy to another.  We contend 
that they vary so much within these two types of regimes that any empirical tests that merely 
distinguish governments as autocratic or democratic are bound to be mis-specified.  We show 
that, when appropriate distinctions are drawn within each of these two types of governments, clear 
and robust empirical findings emerge. 
The importance of incentives within different types of governments becomes immediately 
evident when we think about the sometimes hoped-for benevolent dictator who understands (or 
who is guided by economic advisers who understand) the advantages of markets and uses them 
effectively to elicit economic growth through the rational self-interested behavior of his subjects.  
A moment's reflection reveals a methodological inconsistency: if the autocrat's subjects are 
supposed to be self-interested, we should impartially assume that the autocrat will also take his 
own interests into account.  If he does, then whenever insecurity about his hold on power or 
anything else gives him a short time horizon, he will gain from expropriating any assets of his 
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subjects whose tax-yield to him over the short time horizon is less than their capital value.  He 
will typically also gain resources by printing money to spend on his own purposes, thereby taxing 
real money balances through inflation, and by repudiating his debts.  Such measures increase the 
resources he can use to attempt to keep himself in power or to serve his interests in other ways.  
There are countless examples throughout history of autocrats who have taken such measures.  In 
such cases, the rational self-interest of an autocrat is inconsistent with the private property rights 
that are necessary for an effective market economy. 
By contrast, a similarly rational and self-interested autocrat expecting to rule for a long 
time (and especially one with dynastic expectations) would gain from respecting -- and even 
protecting -- the property of his subjects.  This would increase investment and future productivity 
and thus also his long-run tax collections.  There are also many historical examples of autocrats 
who have served their long-run interests in this way. 
Thus autocrats with different time horizons face dramatically different incentives.  This 
means that we cannot correctly estimate the impact of autocratic government on economic 
performance without taking the time horizons of the individual autocrats into account.  The 
empirical results in this paper suggest that this is a matter of some importance. 
Consider now the factors that can endanger property and contract rights in a beginning 
democracy.  Suppose the democratic debut involves nothing more than an election that gives 
victory to some political leader or optimizing party.  When an elected leader has such power, it 
brings him benefits, so we cannot take it for granted that democratic leaders will be indifferent to 
whether or not they continue in power or that they will exercise their power without regard to their 
own interests.  The elected leadership might maximize its chances of re-election by confiscating 
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the assets of unpopular minorities or of the rich and distributing the proceeds among those from 
whom it hopes to obtain a majority in the next election.  It might sometimes also improve its 
chances of staying in power by seizing opposing media of communication, or the assets of political 
opponents, or any firms or fortunes that are linked to its opponents. 
Such measures terminate or at least endanger the democracy (and often are a sign that the 
current elected leader is on the way to becoming a dictator).  They could not even be implemented 
if the democracy has courts that rigorously enforce the rule of law.  But an initial election 
(however fair) does not by itself guarantee that there is an effective legal system enforcing the rule 
of law.  Thus transitory democracies can easily suffer from expropriations that have the same 
harmful effects on property rights as the predations of an autocrat.  If a government does not have 
(or respect) the legal mechanisms that constrain usurpations of individual rights, it cannot be a 
lasting democracy, but some democracies do not last long. 
The situation in a lasting democracy is utterly different not only from transitory 
democracies but also from autocratic governments.  Though lasting democracies suffer from 
sclerotic accumulations of special-interest lobbying and (like all other types of governments) often 
have economically inefficient policies, they necessarily hold elections under law and the 
governmental leaders or parties that are defeated surrender power in accord with the law.  There 
cannot be genuine elections unless even the leading opponents of the party in power have not only 
political rights but also the economic rights needed to obtain a livelihood.  If even those who are 
the main competitors of the existing leaders of government have these rights, they should normally 
be available to others as well.  (This is true of any lasting representative government, whether it 
has universal adult suffrage, such as is typical now, or a more restrictive suffrage, such as was 
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characteristic of representative governments in the nineteenth century and earlier.  Thus our 
argument applies to all representative governments, but since the representative governments in 
our data base are overwhelmingly universal suffrage democracies, we use the familiar word 
"democracy" to cover all representative governments.) 
Moreover, the independent judiciary, the courts, the respect for law, or whatever other 
mechanisms ensure that a democracy abides by competitive elections held according to law, 
necessarily also ensure that the citizenry has the freedom to do whatever is permitted under the 
law.  This freedom by definition provides some individual rights: individuals have the socially 
protected right to do whatever is not prohibited by law.  Property rights are simply the individual 
rights that relate to things that may be bought and sold.  As James Madison put it, just "as a man is 
said to have a right to his property, he may equally be said to have a property in his rights."
1
  
Property and contract rights are protected by the same institutions that protect other individual 
rights.  Societies are therefore constrained in their choices: they cannot prohibit all types of 
private property and freedom of contract and also have a lasting democracy.  A stable democracy 
without any property and contract rights is not in the feasible set.  All lasting representative 
governments that have been observed, however wise or unwise their laws may be, always have 
extensive property and contract rights. 
                               
1
  In the National Gazette for March 27, 1792 (Madison Papers, 1983). 
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Whereas in an autocracy it is the leader's interest in his future tax returns (and thus in the 
future income of his domain) that is the source of any property and contract rights, in any lasting 
democracy it is the very mechanisms that ensure that a leader can not unilaterally extend his hold 
on power that are the source of property and contract rights.  Though some democracies suffer 
from excessive turnover of leadership, the legal replacement of democratic leaders is in general a 
sign of the effective rule of law, and thus of the property and contract rights of the citizenry. 
Property and contract rights in a democracy rest mainly on the need, if the democracy is to 
last, to leave decisions about whether the law is being followed to relatively disinterested parties.  
Political leaders have an incentive to interpret the law in whatever way best furthers their own 
interests, so a democracy will not last if they can interpret the law as they please.  The rule of law 
needed for a lasting democracy will prevail only if disputes under the law are adjudicated mainly 
by individuals who have no stake in the dispute.  This in turn requires institutions that, by social 
design, have a very special structure of incentives and constraints: one in which those who make 
decisions do not share in the losses or gains of any party to the dispute, and in which a knowledge 
of the law and a reputation for fairness increases the chances for advancement.  To last, a 
democracy must maintain and abide by such institutions, notably courts with an independent 
judiciary. 
We hypothesize that the dependence of any lasting democracy on legal institutions with 
this special structure of incentives and constraints is the main source of property and contract 
rights in democracies.  In an autocracy, on the other hand, the autocrat is by definition the source 
of law and thus above the law and able to override any of his courts.  Thus his motive for 
providing property and contract rights, even if they are provided through courts, is rather mainly 
 
 
8 
his interest in the income and taxable capacity of his domain.  The structures of incentives and 
constraints that give rise to property and contract rights in democracies and autocracies are, 
therefore, dramatically different. 
The foregoing logic leads us to hypothesize that in autocracies it is the time horizon of the 
individual autocrat (or, occasionally, the ruling clique) that is the main determinant of property and 
contract rights, whereas in democracies these rights depend upon whether the democratic system is 
durable. 
Many democracies are transitory and such property and contract rights as they provide can 
be quite inferior to those provided by some secure autocrats.  An autocrat has, however, the 
capacity to seize any assets in the country that he rules, whereas no single individual in a 
continuing democracy can unilaterally seize the assets of others or abrogate their rights under 
contracts.  Any autocratic society will sooner or later come to have rulers with short time horizons 
due to succession crises or other causes.  We therefore hypothesize that democracies that have 
lasted for some time and are expected to last much longer provide better property and contract 
rights than any other type of regime.  The societies that are consistently havens for capital flight 
and that have experienced steady capital accumulation across generations are all lasting 
democracies.
2
 
In this paper we test empirically the theory that has just been described.  Section 2 shows 
how the theory lends itself to relatively straightforward empirical tests, both because here past 
experience is a relatively good guide to the future, and also because the tests are not likely to be 
subject to any severe endogeneity problems.  Section 3 describes our data on regime type, regime 
                               
2
  The foregoing theory is set out more fully in Olson (1991, 1993) and in McGuire and Olson (1996). 
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duration, and property rights.  Section 4 reports empirical findings on property rights and regime 
type, while Section 5 presents findings on property rights and regime duration.  Sections 6, 7, and 
8 test the robustness of our results and show that they are not an artifact of reverse causation, 
sample selection, measurement error, or heteroskedasticity.  We conclude with Section 9. 
2. Empirical Tractability 
However long a political regime has survived, the incentive structure changes drastically if 
that regime is expected to collapse soon.  This expectation will not only change behavior in the 
political system, but will also alter behavior in the market.  Even if property or contract rights are 
good at the moment, it will usually not pay to make long-term contracts or investments if one 
expects that contracts will not be enforced or property rights protected a year from now.  
Therefore, the institutions and policies that determine contract and property rights, like monetary 
and macroeconomic policies, affect reality not only directly but also through their impact on the 
expectations of the participants in the economy. 
It might seem that, because expectations about the future are important, yet not directly 
measurable, the foregoing theory would be difficult to test.  In fact, there are some important and 
interesting reasons that make empirical testing relatively straightforward.  The idea that the past is 
prologue is especially relevant in this area. 
Consider democratic systems first.  The length of time that a legal system has been 
operating is a major determinant of how well property and contract rights are defined and 
delineated.  It is beyond the wit of man to think of all possible contingencies that might lead to 
disputes about contracts or property.  Thus legal systems that have litigated a great many cases 
and have accumulated a vast store of precedents offer better defined and delineated contract and 
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property rights than otherwise similar systems that have just started.  Some new political systems 
have dealt with this problem by adopting wholesale the commercial codes and court precedents of 
other countries.  Though in some cases, such as in the continued use of English common law 
precedents in the United States after it achieved independence, this is relatively easy, there are 
often substantial problems arising from differences in technology, customs, language, and 
experience between the country with the new political system and the country whose legal codes 
and precedents are being adopted.  Thus the length of time a legal system has been operating 
affects the way it works, quite apart from the way that its age affects its viability. 
The impact of age on viability is nicely illustrated by elections in the United States.  
Though there are substantial industries that do economic and political forecasting, one virtually 
never sees forecasts about whether, say, the 1998 Congressional elections will take place.  In 
large part because elections in the US have been held as scheduled for more than 200 years, it is 
simply taken for granted that they will be held as scheduled.  Similarly, the fact that the British 
court system has protected property and contract rights with continuity for more than 300 years 
means that certain property and contract rights in Britain are not the object of explicit forecasts, but 
are unthinkingly taken for granted.  Such tacit assumptions about the institutional reality are, in 
turn, part of the institutional reality: what everyone expects -- and especially what everyone takes 
for granted -- is more likely to happen precisely because of these explicit or tacit expectations. 
New democracies not only usually lack the security that comes from such expectations, but 
they are often also set up in extremely fluid -- and sometimes nearly anarchic -- situations.  When 
the flag of a new democracy is raised, it may not even be clear how many will salute: there is not 
only uncertainty about how long the new democracy will last, but sometimes it is not even clear 
 
 
11 
that the new democracy has the power needed to protect property and contract rights. 
Thus we conclude that the age of a democratic political system is not only directly pertinent 
to the property and contract rights in a democracy, but also a reasonable proxy measure of both the 
likelihood and the popular expectation that a given democratic system and the rights it provides 
will last for the foreseeable future. 
Now let us consider autocracy.  It is instructive to start with Mao's maxim that political 
power grows out of the barrel of a gun.  Accepting this maxim does not imply, however, that an 
autocrat is the best marksman in the country, much less that he personally could outgun any large 
number of his subjects.  The power of an autocrat when he is powerful grows mainly out of the 
belief that his subordinates will use their guns in the service of the autocrat, thereby making it 
exceedingly costly for other subjects to rebel.  But who guards the guards?  What explains why a 
given officer in the autocrat's army or police will obey the autocrat's orders, when they do, in fact, 
obey?  If any officer expects that all or almost all of the other officers will follow the autocrat's 
orders, then he has no choice but to follow these orders also.  What each of the other officers does 
also depends on what they, in turn, expect their colleagues to do.  If almost everyone expects that 
almost all of the officers will follow the autocrat's orders, the autocrat is securely in control and 
likely to remain in control for some time.  What it is rational to do depends on what average 
opinion expects average opinion to be.  When someone has appointed himself the new autocrat, it 
is usually not clear what each officer will expect, or expect that his colleagues will expect.  So 
autocrats who have not consolidated their power do not, in fact, necessarily have much power. 
Thus the power of an autocrat is in large part the outcome of a coordination game.  Just as 
it is irrational to drive on a different side of the road than other people going the same direction 
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expect to use, so it is irrational to ignore the expectations of others in assessing an autocrat's power.  
This means that usually the longer that an autocrat exercises power,  the more people will take for 
granted that his orders will be followed, and the more power he has. 
One check on the validity of the foregoing arguments is the correlation between the elapsed 
duration of an autocrat's rule and the likelihood of a coup.  We calculated the probability of a coup 
for all regimes for all years from the data for 1948-82 as a ratio of two numbers.  The numerator is 
the sum of all autocrats who were deposed by a coup in year t of their tenure. The denominator is 
the sum of all autocrats with tenure greater than or equal to t - 1.  The probabilities of both 
successful and unsuccessful coup attempts are quite high in the first five years of an autocrat's 
tenure, but decline dramatically as duration increases.  The probability of a coup attempt in the 
first year (including successful coups) is 32%, 20% in the second year, and below 10% for most 
years beyond the sixth.  This pattern suggests that the duration of an autocrat's rule is a reasonable 
approximation of regime stability and expected remaining duration.  This pattern is also 
consistent with our use of the log of duration in all empirical specifications, so that increases from, 
say, 0 to 3 years in the elapsed duration of an autocrat's rule are weighted much more heavily than 
increases from 10 to 13 years.  A similar calculation was made for democracies.  Again, the 
probabilities of successful and unsuccessful coups tend to decline as the elapsed duration of 
democracy within a country increases. 
It might be thought that the expected remaining duration of an autocrat's regime would be 
inversely related to the age of the autocrat, since human life is finite and this sets a maximum value 
on the expected remaining duration of an autocrat's regime.  Age and duration increase together, 
making duration to date a suspect proxy for the expected remaining time in power.  However, the 
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prospects of natural death constrain the time horizons of even very old leaders less than one might 
expect.  The probability of death from natural causes in a particular year is not high even at 
advanced ages.  From the life tables of the United States, average remaining years of life exceeds 
five years even for an 80-year-old male.  Furthermore, our use of the log of duration ensures that 
minimal weight is given to further increases in tenure for aging autocrats of long standing included 
in our sample, such as Banda of Malawi and Franco of Spain.  In any event, the expectation of 
natural death will have less impact on an autocrat's incentives than the expectation of exiting via a 
coup.  An autocrat may spend substantial amounts of a country's resources attempting to stave off 
a coup -- or preparing for a luxurious exile -- but there are limits to what he can usefully spend to 
stave off natural death.  A proxy measure that declined in value when autocrats reached advanced 
ages thus might be a less accurate measure of incentives to protect property rights than the one 
used here. 
Thus we take the elapsed duration of an autocrat's (or an autocratic group's) rule and the 
current age of a democratic system as proxies for its expected remaining life: what has survived for 
a long time is expected to be more likely to last than that which is new.  In summary, our theory 
leads us to predict a positive relationship, for both autocracies and democracies, between the 
duration of a regime and the security of the property and contract rights that its citizens enjoy.  For 
both types of regimes, this positive relationship is the result of the joint hypotheses that (1) past 
duration of the regime is positively related to expected future duration, and (2) expected future 
duration is positively related to the security of property and contract rights.  In addition, for 
democracies we argue (3) that the mechanisms that support contract and property rights function 
better, the longer the democracy has been continuously in existence, apart from the effect of 
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duration on expectations of its future life.  Though the incentive structures underlying these 
relationships are different for democracies and autocracies, the expected empirical relationship 
between duration and property rights is the same. 
There is another reason why testing the implications of the foregoing theory is relatively 
straightforward.  The key causal variables are the age of a democratic system and the duration of 
an individual autocrat's rule.  As Grossman and Noh (1990) have shown, the time in office of a 
democratic leader in a political system with free entry is likely to be quite sensitive to the policies 
chosen by that leader.  A leader or political party with a rapacious policy is much less likely to be 
able to win support for continuation in office than one that has followed a policy that favors the 
welfare of the citizenry.  To determine the relationship between the tenure in office of an 
individual democratic leader and his impact on property and contract rights, one would have to 
measure not only the effect of leaders' time horizons on the policies they chose, but also the impact 
of the policies chosen on the probability of re-election.  There would presumably be strong causal 
connections going in both directions and this would complicate empirical testing.  By contrast, 
when the age of a democratic system -- or the length of a single autocrat's rule -- is at issue the 
situation is relatively straightforward. 
In a secure democracy in which the continuation of representative government is taken for 
granted, the incumbent leader may not even give any thought to the implications of his policies for 
the life of the political system.  The property and contract rights at issue are, moreover, more often 
the province of the courts and the legal system than of the elected officials.  In a democracy that is 
quite insecure the courts may be much weaker and the incumbent leader obviously may take an 
interest in the question of how long the democracy will last, since his position as leader may be 
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affected.  But it would be wrong to conclude that he is necessarily motivated by a desire to 
prolong the life of the democracy: he could, for the reasons set out above, also be motivated by a 
desire to become a dictator who does not have to continue to answer to the electorate.  Thus, just 
as he might choose policies that are intended to increase the life of the democracy, so he might 
choose policies with the opposite objective.  While our theoretical framework suggests that there 
should be a strong tendency for lasting democracies to have better individual rights than those that 
have not yet been securely established, it does not suggest that there should be any strong and 
regular tendency for democratic leaders to choose policies about property and contract rights that 
are intended to change the duration of the democratic system.  Accordingly, our theory implies 
that the age of a democratic system is not directly influenced by policy choices.  Policy choices 
may influence the survival probability of a democratic system through their impact on economic 
performance, but we control for per capita GDP levels and growth rates and this should capture 
much of the effect of any endogenous policy choices.  We shall later see that our statistical 
examination of this issue offers further reassurance. 
In the case of autocracy, there can be no doubt that an autocrat has an incentive to choose 
policies that will extend his tenure.  Though this effect can indeed lead to bias in our estimates, the 
bias runs against our hypothesis.  We assume autocrats optimize, so that an autocrat with a low 
survival probability increases his exactions and reduces his expenditures on the legal 
infrastructure.  One reason he does this is because he has little reason to take account of the 
reduction in future tax receipts that this brings about.  Another reason is that he rationally gives a 
relatively higher value to resources that he can obtain now to shore up his hold on power by 
strengthening his instruments of social control and by subsidizing pivotal allies.  Though a 
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government whose survival depends on popularity with an electorate may gain from lowering 
taxes, an autocrat's tenure does not depend on any electorate.  It typically depends instead on the 
power and loyalty of his military and police forces and on the support of his allies.
3
  He needs 
resources to obtain this power, loyalty, and support.  If most autocrats tried to extend their tenures 
by improving the welfare of their subjects, much of the effects of this behavior would in any event 
be captured by per capita GDP levels and growth rates, which we control for. 
Thus in our model an autocrat's incentive to increase taxes and reduce expenditures on 
legal infrastructure improves his survival probabilities.  Higher taxes still have an opportunity 
cost for an autocrat, however: higher taxes (and insecure property and contract rights) reduce 
future GDP levels.  At a sufficiently high probability of survival, the costs of foregone future tax 
revenues from reducing GDP outstrip the benefits from using current tax revenues to extend one's 
tenure, particularly if one makes the reasonable assumption that survival probabilities increase at a 
diminishing rate as expenditures on repressive forces and pivotal allies increase. 
                               
3
  See Olson (1965) on the logic behind this conclusion and Lichbach (1995) for a most thorough survey of 
the literature on this subject.  See also Svensson (1994) for a broadly similar model in which investments in legal 
infrastructure in period 1 are negatively related to the current government's prospects of remaining in power in period 
2.  Unlike our results reported below, Svensson's empirical tests utilize only country-level averages of instability, 
property rights, and investment, and do not differentiate democracies from autocracies. 
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Accordingly, optimization by insecure autocrats assures that they adjust their economic 
policies to make their tenure less short or insecure than it would otherwise be.  They do this by 
increasing their exactions or confiscations to obtain more resources for protecting their hold on 
power.  To the extent that autocrats who would otherwise have a short tenure succeed in 
extending their hold on power, our coefficients on the duration of autocrats tend to be biased 
downward: those insecure autocrats whose expedient expropriations have enabled them to cling to 
power for extended periods reduce the generally positive association between the elapsed duration 
of an autocrat's rule and the security of property and contract rights.  We nonetheless later report 
the results of tests that correct for the possibility our coefficients are biased upwards by a feedback 
from improved policies to lengthened tenure. 
 
3. Regime Types, Regime Duration and Property Rights: The Data 
This section describes the variables we use to assess regime types, regime duration, and 
property and contract rights.  Since both the regime type and regime duration variables have been 
newly constructed for this paper and should ultimately also prove useful to other investigators, we 
must describe them fully.  But the rest of the paper should be comprehensible even to those 
readers who have skipped this section. 
3.1. Defining Regime Types 
Most recent empirical studies of democracy and economic performance make use of 
Gastil's (1989) measures of political rights and/or civil liberties.  The Gastil measures include 
some rights that are more nearly outcomes of political and economic processes than defining 
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features or requisites of a democratic political system.
4
  Given that our interest is in assessing the 
impact of regime type on property rights, the outcomes-based nature of the Gastil indexes makes 
them inappropriate indicators of democracy.  In addition, they do not cover part of our sample 
period. 
                               
4
  The civil liberties checklist includes "personal social rights, including those to property, internal and 
external travel, choice of residence, marriage, and family," "freedom from gross social inequality," "freedom from 
gross government indifference or corruption," and "socio-economic rights: including freedom from dependency on 
landlords, bosses, union leaders, or bureaucrats."  The political rights checklist includes "recent shifts in power 
through elections," "significant opposition vote," and "informal consensus: de facto opposition power." 
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Our definition of democracy is procedural.  In a democratic regime the chief executive 
and the legislature are both elected in competitive elections and the legislature is effective, in the 
sense that it has considerable autonomy.  In this definition both presidential and parliamentary 
systems can be fully democratic.  A regime falls short of full democracy if the elections are not 
fully competitive or if the executive's power is so predominant that the legislature does not provide 
an effective check on that power. 
Our definition of democracy is procedural, but the existence of competitive democratic 
procedures implies the existence of certain rights.  It is obviously impossible for a society to have 
continuing and truly competitive elections unless certain freedoms are maintained.  Thus 
continuing representative government implies free speech, the right to campaign freely, the right to 
form political parties, the right of peaceful demonstration, and freedom from arbitrary arrest.  It 
also implies that at least some opponents of the party in power must be able to survive 
economically, and thus have at least enough property and contract rights to remain viable.  The 
only fully competitive elections are those in which even the opponents of the party in power have 
the rights they need to compete and to survive. 
A full-fledged dictatorship, on the other hand, is a regime in which neither the chief 
executive nor the legislature (if one exists) is chosen in a competitive election, or one in which a 
competitively-elected legislature is rendered ineffective by a non-elected (or not competitively 
elected) executive.
5
 
                               
5
  The definitions of democracy and dictatorship refer exclusively to the characteristics of the national 
government.  We do not attempt to characterize the selection of officials at the sub-national levels. 
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We classify regimes by relying as much as possible on the judgments made by other 
observers, although in a few situations we draw our own inferences in resolving ambiguities.  
These instances are explained below.  Our basic sources for data on selection of the chief 
executive and effectiveness of the legislature are Gurr's Polity II (1990) and Banks (1979).  Our 
classification assigns a number from I to V to each country in each year, where these numbers have 
the following meanings: 
 I. Dictatorship 
 II. Almost Dictatorship 
 III. Intermediate Category 
 IV. Almost Democracy 
 V. Democracy 
 
These classifications are based on the variables executive competitiveness (XRCOMP) 
from Gurr and executive selection (EXSELEC) and legislative effectiveness (LEGEF) in Banks.  
Gurr and Banks provide two alternative judgments about the selection of the chief executive.  
Gurr's XRCOMP classifies countries into one of three categories with respect to how the chief 
executive is selected.  These may be loosely described as (1) no elections or rigged elections; (2) 
dual/transitional, where there are two executives or there is a transition between selection and 
election; and (3) competitive election.  Banks' EXSELEC provides essentially a two-way 
classification: the chief executive is either elected or not.  Banks' LEGEF classifies countries into 
one of three categories with respect to the legislature: (1) no legislature or one that is rendered 
completely ineffective by domestic turmoil or by the actions of the chief executive; (2) a partially 
effective legislature; (3) an effective legislature, elected under competitive conditions. 
Five categories (I-V) are derived from these variables in the following way.  A 
full-fledged Democracy (V) is in the top category on all three variables, while a full-fledged 
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Dictatorship (I) is in the bottom category on XRCOMP and LEGEF.  An Almost Democracy (IV) 
falls short of the top rating on either XRCOMP or LEGEF, while an Almost Dictatorship (II) is in 
the intermediate category on LEGEF.  The other cases are classified in the Intermediate Category 
(III), or are inconsistent (for example, because Gurr and Banks rate the chief executive differently, 
or because the legislature is rated as fully effective yet the chief executive was selected rather than 
elected).
6
  In our empirical tests below, we treat countries in categories IV or V as democracies, 
and countries in categories I and II as autocracies.  The small number of country-year 
observations in category III are omitted. 
The Gurr and Banks data are available only through 1986.  Our research assistant Suzanne 
Gleason updated regimes codings through 1990, relying primarily on the Europa Yearbook.  Only 
seven countries were judged to have changed classification between 1986 and 1990. 
Empirically, the differences between our procedural definition and the Gastil 
outcomes-based measures turn out to be relatively minor.
7
  A crucial advantage of our measure 
for present purposes is that the data it is based on are available well before the 1973 beginning date 
for Gastil's indexes. 
                               
6
  Our conception of democracy is fundamentally consistent with the conceptions of Bollen (1990) and other 
political scientists who have adopted a procedural definition of democracy.  There is a conceptual difference, though, 
between our scheme and those that add up the scores on different indicators.  Such a methodology assumes that the 
contribution of a characteristic to the democratic nature of a regime is independent of the level of other characteristics.  
However, the marginal productivity of an input (in this case, in producing democracy) usually depends on the level of 
other inputs.  A dictator who tolerates freedom of the press during periods in which he feels secure in his position 
does not on that account become a more democratic ruler.  Similarly, the fact that the ballots are counted honestly 
does not make a regime more democratic if important political alternatives are prevented from participating in the 
elections.  Our classification does not yield a ranking identical to one obtained from a mechanical adding up of the 
scores on each of the component indicators.  See the Appendix for a summary of our classification scheme. 
7
  The simple Spearman rank-order correlations between our 5-category political regime indicator and the 
7-point Gastil measures are quite high: 0.87 for political rights and 0.82 for civil liberties.  Changes in Gastil ratings 
of countries over time are highly correlated with changes in our classification.  Correlations of each with property 
rights indicators differ very little. 
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3.2. Measurement of Regime Duration 
For democracies, we create two duration measures:  DEMDUR refers to the number of 
consecutive years that a country has been a democracy
8
 (i.e., regime type IV or V), while 
DEXDUR is the number of years that the chief executive has been in office in a democracy.  
Thus, DEMDUR is reset to one in any year in which the country lapses from democratic status 
(i.e., drops to category III or below), while DEXDUR is reset to one in any year in which the chief 
executive changes. 
For autocracies, the variable AUTDUR is defined as the number of consecutive years that 
the chief executive in an autocratic nation has been in power.  The value of AUTDUR thus 
increases by one for each year that the autocrat remains in power and the regime remains in either 
of the categories I and II.  The variable is reset to one in any year in which the chief executive 
changes.  This proxy for the time horizons of decision makers in autocracies fits the simplest and 
most common type of modern autocracy: one-man rule with no established procedures for 
succession. 
                               
8
  Our data on property rights go back no further than 1969.  In measuring duration of regimes, we begin 
counting in 1930.  Since we use the log of duration in regressions, neglecting to identify an earlier starting date for 
democracy in the U.S., Britain, etc. affects our estimates for DEMDUR's impact only trivially. 
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There are, however, some cases for which this proxy for autocratic time horizons does not 
apply.  Though autocracies are much less likely to be institutionalized than democracies, some 
relatively autocratic or at least non-democratic regimes have achieved a degree of 
institutionalization.  For these regimes, the duration of the chief executive will be a somewhat 
noisy measure.  In exceptional cases, such as Mexico in the heyday of the PRI, where 
institutionalization reaches levels that are not normally found outside of the advanced 
democracies, the expected remaining duration of the President's rule is never more than his 
institutionally given single term of six years, but the time horizon of the PRI's oligarchic 
establishment has been far longer.  In the more general case of undemocratic and entrenched 
ruling parties,
9
 the chief executive may be removed by the party's ruling council or Politburo while 
the dictatorial rule of the party continues.  As in Saudi Arabia, the monarch often attains and 
maintains power only with the backing of other members of the royal family.  For a chief 
executive who intends to have his son succeed him in power, the autocratic planning horizon is so 
long that any confiscation that reduces investment and thus future income and tax collections will 
not be advantageous.  What is common to all of these cases is the presence of a "ruling group," a 
family or party with an indefinitely long life span and thus a longer-run interest in the nation's 
long-term economic performance than an individualistic  autocrat would have.  Autocratic ruling 
groups usually also impose some constraints on the unilateral decisions of their leaders.
10
 
                               
9
  In addition to Mexico, prominent examples include Taiwan and most communist countries (which are not 
in our sample). 
10
  The chief of such a dictatorial party usually has little chance of success if he attempts to use society's 
resources to maintain power in the face of widespread opposition within his party.  The costs of losing power are also 
usually lower where autocracy is institutionalized, as the party can offer a deposed leader credible guarantees of a safe, 
comfortable retirement. 
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These considerations lead us to adopt a second measure of tenure for autocracies, the 
duration of the ruling group (AUTGROUP).  Whenever one autocrat is succeeded by another 
autocrat belonging to the same "group," the counter variable AUTGROUP continues, rather than 
re-starting at one, as AUTDUR does.  As with AUTDUR and DEMDUR, we hypothesize that 
far-sighted policies regarding property rights will be associated with higher values of 
AUTGROUP, our measure of stability of the ruling group.  In defining groups, our primary 
criterion is the peaceful transfer of power.  Except in rare circumstances (such as an overthrow 
within a ruling family, as in Oman in 1970), exit via a coup is regarded as a change in group.  
Information from Europa Yearbook and other sources was used in judging the extent to which a 
new leader represented a sharp break with his predecessor.  Monarchical succession, and transfers 
of power within strong ruling parties (or revolutionary councils) were coded as occurring within a 
given group.  In all, about 30 percent of transfers were judged to be intra-group. 
 
3.3. Property Rights Measures 
There are many ways in which governments can violate -- or fail to protect against private 
theft and usurpation -- the property and contract rights of its citizens and subjects: direct 
expropriation of assets, defaulting on public debt, debasing the currency, prohibiting any 
transactions other than those at officially established prices, and failing to provide a legal 
infrastructure that impartially enforces contracts and adjudicates disputes about property rights.  
No one measure can capture all of these aspects of property and contract rights, so we use six 
separate variables: the amount of "contract-intensive money" (defined below), indexes from two 
firms evaluating risks to foreign investors, a subjective measure of default risk, currency 
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depreciation, and the black market exchange premium. 
"Contract-intensive money" (CIM) is defined as (M2-C)/M2, where M2 is a broad definition 
of money and C is currency outside banks.  In environments in which third-party enforcement of 
contracts is reliable and where property rights facilitate pledging of assets as security for loans, 
banks and other financial intermediaries will profit from providing retail banking services at low 
cost, and sometimes even from paying interest on bank deposits, in order to obtain money that they 
can lend at higher rates.  If the public can rely on institutional stability and third-party 
enforcement of contracts, they can be confident that the banks or government will not confiscate 
their deposits.  Thus the rationale for this measure is that those forms of money, such as currency, 
that rely least on the fulfillment of contractual obligations by others will be preferred when 
property and contractual rights are insecure, whereas other forms of money are more advantageous 
for most purposes in environments with secure contract-enforcement and property rights.  Since 
the non-currency components of M2 are, by definition, held in banks or other financial institutions, 
poor contract enforcement and property rights imply that any advantages of using money in the 
form of deposits in financial institutions are small and that there is also the risk that sums deposited 
will not be recovered.  Thus the poorer contract-enforcement and other institutions in a society, 
the smaller the proportion of contract-intensive money individuals will hold.  We have found the 
proportion of contract-intensive money to be a useful and reliable measure in other contexts as 
well.
11
 
For two other measures of property rights, we employ ratings compiled by two private 
                               
11
  For a more extensive description of and justification for CIM, and evidence on its relationship to 
economic performance, see Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson (1995). 
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firms for potential foreign investors.  Though these ratings are subjective, the firms that produced 
them for sale had an incentive to make them as accurate as possible, and the fact that they were 
purchased by investors who would lose from wrong information also adds something to their 
credibility.  The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), published since 1982, covers more 
than 100 countries.  Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) has provided ratings for 
about 50 countries beginning in 1972. 
From five variables contained in one of these sources and four scored by the other, we 
create the two simple additive indices, "ICRG" and "BERI."
12
  The five variables comprising the 
ICRG index are "Expropriation Risk," "Risk of Contract Repudiation by the Government," 
"Quality of the Bureaucracy," "Corruption in Government," and "Rule of Law."
13
  Variables 
entering the BERI index include "Contract Enforceability," "Nationalization Risk," "Bureaucratic 
Delays," and "Infrastructure Quality."
14
 
"Contract Enforceability" by BERI and "Risk of Repudiation of Contracts by Government" 
by ICRG are measures of how well contracts are enforced.  "Rule of Law" scores reflect the 
strength of the court system and the degree to which citizens accept the lawmaking powers and 
dispute resolution mechanisms of legal institutions, rather than depending on force or other illegal 
means to settle claims.
15
  Definitions of "Corruption in Government," "Quality of the 
                               
12
  These simple additive scales were found to be highly correlated (r > .99) with alternative scales weighted 
by factor scores generated from factor analyses. 
13
  The latter 3 measures are scored on a 0-6 scale.  We multiply them by 10/6 to put them on the same 0-10 
scale as the former 2 variables.  The resulting additive index has a potential range of 0-50. 
14
  Each variable is scored 0-4, with fractional values possible.  BERI scores are averages from a permanent 
panel of experts, while ICRG ratings are evaluated by the staff of Political Risk Services. 
15
  High scores for "Rule of Law" also indicate "provisions for an orderly succession of power," raising the 
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Bureaucracy," "Bureaucratic Delays," and "Transportation and Communication Quality" justify 
their use as measures of the general efficiency of provision of government services as well as the 
extent of rent-seeking behavior of government officials.
16
 
                                                                                                   
possibility that correlations with regime type might be tautological.  Deleting "Rule of Law" from our ICRG index 
does not change any results, however, as this alternative index is correlated with the one we use at .998. 
16
  See Knack and Keefer (1995) for more detailed definitions and discussion of the ICRG and BERI 
variables.  Some of these variables may be taken as empirical proxies for Clague's concept of "rule obedience" 
(Clague, 1993). 
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Our fourth measure of property and contract rights is a subjective rating of the risk of 
default on sovereign debt.  This "credit rating" variable (CREDIT) can range from 0 to 100 
(higher values indicate a lower risk of default, but values are not interpretable as probabilities).  
This measure is an average of evaluations by a panel of international bankers published 
semi-annually by Institutional Investor.
17
 
Our fifth measure is the debasement of the currency as measured by the rate of currency 
depreciation (DEPREC), which is equal to (100 + inflation rate)/100.  Inflation (as well as default 
on the sovereign debt) can be viewed as an indirect method of expropriation, an alternative to 
directly expropriating assets. 
Our final measure is the (log of the) black market premium on currency exchange 
(PREMIUM).  A high black market premium suggests that there are exchange controls and severe 
import restrictions.  These controls and restrictions not only limit the types of contracts and the 
uses of property that are permissible in a country, but also give government officials a wide range 
of discretionary power through the granting or withholding of licenses and other permissions. 
Each of the foregoing measures has its own idiosyncrasies, but to the extent they are 
uncorrelated, they can be viewed as complementary.  Our empirical findings are not dependent on 
the use of any one of these measures. 
3.4. Control Variables  
Given the dearth of empirical literature on the determinants of property rights, there are no 
well-established precedents on model specification.  We include only (the log of) per capita 
                               
17
  We use the mean of the two scores assigned each year (in March and September) to a country as the 
country's value for that year. 
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income and time variables as regressors accompanying regime type and duration indicators in the 
regressions reported in the tables. 
Theoretical accounts of property rights claim that more is spent to define and protect 
property rights when the rights themselves become more valuable.  Growth could make them 
more valuable (Eggertsson, 1990).  Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986, pp. 115-117) have noted that 
formal arrangements for protecting property rights, such as judicial systems based on precedent, 
are not instituted until there is a sufficient volume of transactions to make them practicable.  We 
can imperfectly control for these effects by including per capita income and aggregate GDP as 
proxies for the value of assets and volume of transactions.
18
  One might alternatively posit a 
threshold effect, whereby for example a legal system is instituted when the value of assets and 
volume of transactions imply that the social benefits of setting up courts exceed the social costs.  
Casual observation does not support such a view -- even in very small developing countries, 
increased expenditures on courts would surely pass such a cost-benefit test
19
  --  and we do not 
test for threshold effects. 
                               
18
  Aggregate GDP is generally not a significant determinant of our property rights measures, and has 
virtually no impact on coefficients for regime type and duration variables.  Thus, regressions reported in tables below 
do not include this variable. 
19
  In Egypt, many courts do not operate much during the summer months due to a simple lack of air 
conditioning (Washington Post, March 13, 1995). 
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The close historical connection between the emergence of democratic political institutions 
and the development of property and contract rights poses problems for testing the causal effects of 
one upon the other.  A consensus is forming on the view that secure property and contract rights 
are important facilitators of economic growth.  Thus a high level of income in a society today 
suggests that there were good property and contract rights in the past.  Given the persistence of the 
institutions that sustain property and contract rights, income is also a good predictor of these 
institutions.  Moreover, there are many aspects of a political regime that influence growth and 
hence, over time, the level of income.  These include bureaucratic competence, political 
legitimacy, and rule obedience, on the one hand, and susceptibilities to political violence and 
extreme inequalities, on the other.  These characteristics also tend to persist.  Thus a high level of 
income in a society today usually means that there was a well-functioning political regime in the 
past, and, because of persistence of these characteristics, it also increases the probability that the 
current political regime also has these attributes. 
What makes our empirical analysis of the effects of political regimes possible is that there 
are some independent forces producing changes in political regime.  In particular there have been 
wars won by democracies, after which democracies were set up in countries that had lacked them.  
More importantly for our sample, massive decolonization has occurred, as well as other historical 
factors that have altered many countries' political institutions. 
But it remains true that current period income contains much information about the current 
state of property rights and political regime.  Since our analysis controls for current income and 
necessarily employs relatively crude measures of political regimes to investigate the impact of 
political conditions on property rights, our tests are quite demanding. 
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There are some secular and exogenous developments that may also affect the security of 
property and contract rights.  The proportion of contract-intensive money (CIM) may be sensitive 
to advances in banking technology that lower the costs of intermediation.  For subjective 
measures that have ceilings on the maximum possible scores, each country might be rated with 
reference to other countries at a given point in time: mean scores for the world could then remain 
constant even with a general improvement over time in the security of property and contract rights 
around the world.  To avoid spuriously associating such changes, or nonchanges, with regime 
type and duration, time (equal to the current year minus 1969) is included as an explanatory 
variable.
20
 
The proportion of contract-intensive money (CIM) might seem likely to be greatly 
influenced by inflation and interest rates (Clague et al., 1995).  In fact, the inclusion of these 
variables has only a minute impact on the coefficients for regime type and duration in CIM 
equations.  They are accordingly not included in the results reported here. 
Inequalities in income and wealth and other social cleavages based on ethnicity, religion, 
or region may generate social conflict endangering individual rights.  Similarly, culture, religion, 
and colonial heritage may influence property and contractual rights.  We do not include measures 
of these as regressors, however.  For our sample, the coverage of available data over time and 
across countries on inequality and other social cleavages is inadequate.  Existing theories do not 
account for the differences in the apparent effects of cultural variables across regions or over time: 
why did British influences lead to strong property rights regimes only in some former colonies?  
                               
20
  Results using the log of time were very similar.  In fixed effects regressions, we use 
year dummies instead of time. 
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Why was "Confucianism" until relatively recently thought to be unfavorable to economic 
development?  Also, since others have used cultural and heritage indicators to explain political 
freedoms (Bhalla, 1994; Abrams and Lewis, 1993), inclusion of these variables as regressors along 
with regime type would potentially confound tests of the latter's impact on property rights.  In any 
event, to the extent that inequality, other social cleavages, culture, and colonial heritage remain 
constant over time, their effects are captured by country intercepts in our fixed effects tests. 
4. Property and Contract Rights in Different Types of Regimes 
Some recent and sophisticated statistical studies on postwar data have supported Lipset's 
(1959) thesis that high incomes are conducive to the emergence and survival of democracy (Barro, 
1994; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994; Helliwell, 1994).  By contrast, there is no clear tendency 
that has yet emerged from studies of the effects of democracy on economic performance.  The 
three studies just cited conclude that democracy has either no influence or a negative influence on 
subsequent growth.  A recent study by Bhalla (1994), on the other hand, finds a positive effect of 
political rights on growth.
21
  Consistent with Bhalla's results is evidence from earlier periods of 
history suggesting that representative or at least non-absolutist government is favorable to 
economic performance (e.g., de Long and Shleifer, 1992). 
We focus here on one of the proposed links between regime type and economic 
performance: the hypothesis that more democratic regimes will better protect property and 
contract rights.  We have elsewhere documented the impact of property and contract rights on 
                               
21
  The difference in results between Bhalla and the other three studies appears to relate mainly to the choice 
of other independent variables and instruments for democracy.  We focus on these four studies because they make use 
of the most recent data on a large number of countries and because they pay careful attention to endogeneity problems, 
mainly through the use of instrumental and lagged variables.  The earlier literature is also thoroughly inconclusive 
regarding the effects of democracy on growth.  See, for examples, the review in Brunetti and Weder (1993). 
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investment and growth rates (Clague et al., 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995). 
The effects of regime type -- and of regime duration -- were first tested with pooled 
time-series cross-sectional regressions, using country-years as units of analysis.  Results of these 
tests were very supportive of the hypotheses.
22
  Errors from these regressions, however, were 
highly autocorrelated, indicating that it is inappropriate to treat yearly observations of a country as 
independent. 
In a purely cross-sectional design, on the other hand, difficulties arise in assigning values 
for regime type for countries moving across categories one or more times over the period.  
Averaging the different regime types -- i.e., treating a country shifting from type II to type IV 
halfway through the period identically to one remaining a category III over the entire period -- 
would unjustifiably impose cardinality on our regime type index as well as fail to make use of 
important variations in the data. 
We adopted two alternative solutions.  First, we created an observation for each 
country-regime, i.e. for each spell of democracy (for regressions with DEMDUR), and for each 
period that a particular autocrat rules (for AUTDUR).
23
  With country-regime units of analysis, 
we retained some over-time variation across regime types within countries, but suffered far less 
serious autocorrelation problems (as confirmed by Durbin-Watson statistics).  Second, we 
retained country-year units of analysis but incorporated fixed country and/or regime effects, 
thereby arguably removing the most important sources of possible autocorrelation and 
                               
22
  Results available on request from authors. 
23
  Thus, Egypt in 1954-1969, 1970-80, and 1981-1990 (1990 is the last year for our regimes and income 
data) constitute three separate observations in Table 1 and in the AUTDUR panel of Table 3.  In the AUTGROUP 
panel of Table 3, Egypt 1954-90 is one observation as Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak are all judged to be of the same 
"group." 
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heteroskedasticity. 
Table 1 presents cross-sectional regressions, using country-regime units of analysis, 
examining the effects of regime type on property rights (mean values over the period), controlling 
for mean per capita income and mean time over the period the country-regime lasts.
24
  In each 
case we find democracies outperforming autocracies, even controlling for the higher per capita 
incomes prevailing in most democracies.  The Autocracy coefficient has the expected sign in all 
six cases: negative for CIM, ICRG, BERI, and CREDIT, and positive for DEPREC and 
PREMIUM.  These coefficients are highly significant for two of these property rights variables.  
Higher incomes are associated with significantly better scores on each of the dependent variables 
with the exception of DEPREC.  The latter, along with PREMIUM and CIM, all significantly 
increase with time, controlling for income and regime type.  The time trend in CIM probably 
reflects secular improvements in banking technology.  Negative coefficients for time on CREDIT 
and (in some specifications) BERI suggest that scores for these variables reflect only the relative 
positions of countries at a single point in time. 
                               
24
  "Time" = year - 1969.  Where there is missing data on a dependent variable for some years within a 
country-regime, we delete time and income data for the corresponding years.  Calculating mean time and mean 
income for Franco's regime using all available data from the 1930s onward would yield means far below those that 
actually apply to (for example) the 1972-90 period covered by BERI.  Then, income and time would underpredict 
BERI, and positive BERI residuals would be spuriously associated with a high duration value. 
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The finding that democracies as a group outperform autocracies in protecting property and 
contractual rights does not, if the arguments at the beginning of this article are right, necessarily 
imply that the short- or medium-term effects of  shift from autocracy to democracy are an 
improvement in performance.  To explore this issue, we shift to country-year units of analysis, to 
exploit the time-series variation in the data, and control for fixed country-specific effects.  The 
autocracy coefficient under this approach is influenced only by over-time variation in regime type 
and property rights.  Given the length of our sample period (9 to 22 years, depending on the 
dependent variable), this test is designed to reveal short- or medium-term effects of changes in 
regime type on our property rights variables.  Estimates from country-regime regressions in Table 
1 are heavily influenced by democracies of long standing, in Western Europe and among the 
English-speaking nations.  No nation remaining a democracy (or an autocracy) over the entire 
sample period influences the autocracy coefficients in Table 2; those estimates are based solely on 
over-time variation within countries.  Results for the autocracy dummy in Table 2 are thus the 
product of a relatively small number of countries with inter-regime shifts during the sample 
period.
25
 
The results summarized in Table 2 strongly indicate that new democracies tend to face 
many of the difficulties, outlined earlier in the paper, that can render property rights less secure 
than in a country ruled by a secure autocrat.  Autocracy is associated with significantly higher 
CIM and BERI values, and significantly lower inflation (coefficients on the other three variables 
are not significant).  Many of the benefits of democracy seem to accrue only over a substantial 
                               
25
  During our sample period eight countries shifted from autocracy to democracy, two shifted in the other 
direction, and eleven more experienced multiple shifts (e.g. Chile). 
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period of time, which may exceed the duration of most new democracies installed in our sample 
period.  Most importantly, longstanding democracies, unlike all other regimes, have a predictable 
succession of power.  They also tend to have more effective checks on executive power, in the 
form of independent legislatures, central banks, and judiciaries, and this makes it more difficult for 
any leader to abridge property or contract rights.
26
  In new democracies such as Argentina, 
Nigeria (abortively), and Pakistan, by contrast, individuals cannot enter into long-term contracts 
secure in the knowledge that successions will be orderly and legal, and that a chief executive 
cannot preempt the powers of other branches of government. 
                               
26
  In the U.S., the role of the Supreme Court as a check on unconstitutional actions of the Congress was not 
established, nor recognized, until Marbury v. Madison, decided during Jefferson's presidency. 
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In addition to the uncertainty and instability pervading new democracies generally, other 
factors potentially contribute to the positive Autocracy coefficients in Table 2.  First, new 
democracies in recent years are hardly a random sample of all democracies.  These "marginal" 
democracies exhibit a substantially worse income distribution, more ethnic tensions, and more 
political violence than exhibited by countries remaining democracies throughout the 1970s and 
80s.  Prevailing social conditions often subject these new democracies to extraordinary populist 
pressures, which autocrats in these same countries were (sometimes) better able to resist.
27
  
Second, democracies are more likely to replace successful autocracies.  Autocracies almost never 
replace democracies unless the latter are performing poorly -- when their legitimacy in the eyes of 
the public is especially low.  Conversely, with the exception of Argentina, autocrats giving way to 
new democratic regimes during our sample period apparently chose to do so when the economic 
climate was favorable for a smooth transition to democracy (as in Chile, Uruguay, and Turkey).  
Given these selection processes, the autocracy coefficient in fixed-effects tests is conceivably 
capturing a regression-to-the-mean effect: autocrats succeeding democracies have more 
opportunity to improve the policy climate than do leaders of democracies succeeding autocrats. 
 
5. Property Rights and Regime Duration 
                               
27
  Keefer and Knack (1995) find that income distribution is a more important determinant of property rights 
and risk of loan defaults in democracies than in autocracies.  Persson and Tabellini (1994) find that inequality is 
harmful to growth, particularly in democracies.  One could alternatively interpret a significant interaction between 
democracy and inequality in growth equations as implying that democracy is beneficial to growth where and only 
where there exists a suitably egalitarian distribution of income. 
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For the reasons set out at the beginning of this paper, we hypothesize that the length of time 
a democratic system has survived and the time horizons of each autocrat are important 
determinants of the effects of regime type on property and contract rights.  If these temporal 
considerations are as important as we expect them to be, any comparisons of economic 
performance under autocracy and democracy that leave them out are likely to be mis-specified.  
The same is true for the comparisons of property and contract rights under differing regime types 
in the preceding section. 
In this section, we test our hypotheses about how duration of regime affects the security of 
property and contract rights in each type of regime.  That is, we test our hypothesis that autocrats 
with longer duration will be associated with better property and contract rights than short-term 
autocrats, and our hypothesis that the longer a democratic system has lasted the better these rights 
will be. 
Table 3 regressions test for the impact of regime duration on the security of property rights.  
As with Table 1, cross-sectional regressions using country-regime units are reported in Table 3.  
Control variables include mean income and time.  Autocracies and democracies are separated for 
these tests, as duration is defined differently for each group. 
The coefficient for duration of autocrats (AUTDUR) -- specifically, the log of duration the 
year the regime ends -- has the expected sign in every case in Table 3, with three of these 
statistically significant at .05 or better.  Results are similar for AUTGROUP, with better policies 
associated with higher duration of the ruling group in every case, and significant associations in 
three cases. 
Coefficients for the duration of democratic regimes (DEMDUR) are all in the expected 
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direction, with three significant at the .05 level.  These generally favorable results on DEMDUR 
are consistent with the view that new democracies cannot offer investors the same predictability 
(of succession) and credibility (of policy) offered by the longstanding democracies. 
This emphasis on the importance of the duration of democratic systems does not apply to 
the tenure of particular leaders of democracies.  While policy making in democracies is not  
immune to the short-term needs of chief executives with limited time horizons, there are far more 
powerful checks on the ability of chief executives in democracies, compared to autocrats, to 
expropriate assets, to renege on debts, and to print money. 
The results in Table 3 support the view that the duration of democracy itself matters more 
than the time in power of chief executives in democracies.  For these tests, we define democratic 
leader regimes similarly to autocratic regimes: each unit of analysis corresponds to the time in 
power of a chief executive.  For all six dependent variables, the effect of a one-year increase in the 
duration of a democratic leader (DEXDUR) has a smaller impact (see fourth panel of Table 3) than 
an identical increase in the duration of democracy (see third panel). 
Our theory also suggests that the impact of DEXDUR should be weaker than the impact of 
AUTDUR -- the duration of autocratic leaders.  The estimated impacts of leader duration are  
similar, however, for autocrats and for democratic chief executives in the cross-sectional tests 
reported in Table 3.  The results from fixed-effects models reported below, on the other hand, are 
supportive of our theory. 
Table 4 illustrates the economic significance of results in Table 3 by substituting values for 
time, income and duration into the regressions to determine the predicted values of property rights 
indicators.  The values in each cell correspond to predicted values of the property rights variables 
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with time = 11 (i.e., 1980) and per capita income of $2500.  Within each row, duration increases 
from 2 to 10 to 25.  For each dependent variable, there are four rows, corresponding to autocratic 
leaders, autocrat "groups," democratic leaders, and democratic regimes.  The most dramatic 
improvements associated with increasing duration occur for the democratic regimes, particularly 
for ICRG, DEPREC, and PREMIUM.  Focusing on the column for which duration = 2, new 
autocrats have "better" values than new democracies on four of the six dependent variables.  
However, democratic regimes lasting 25 years outscore autocrats of 25 years duration on four out 
of six measures.  While many democracies surpass 25 years in duration, there is an upper limit to 
how long an individual autocrat can last.  These results are consistent with the theory that 
longstanding democracies provide the most secure property rights. 
We further explore the effects of duration variables using fixed-effects regressions.  With 
the cross-sectional design of Table 3 regressions, we cannot rule out unobserved country-specific 
variables that may be responsible for both high rates of leadership turnover and insecure property 
and contractual rights.  By including country dummies in regressions using the full time series 
available, we can examine the influence of variations in the duration of leaders over time, within 
countries, on the property rights variables.
28
 
In five out of six cases (all except CREDIT), increases in autocratic duration (AUTDUR) 
are associated with highly significant improvements in our property and contract rights measures 
                               
28
  Results on the log of autocrat duration are generally weaker when regime dummies are substituted for 
country dummies.  Regime effects are highly correlated within countries, and add very little explanatory power over 
the country intercepts.  The major difference between the two models is that within a regime (as opposed to a country) 
over time, duration always increases -- when a new autocrat comes into power, duration re-starts at 1.  As time and 
(usually) income also increase each year, there are potentially serious multicollinearity problems using regime 
dummies.  (Using time, as opposed to year dummies, and duration, as opposed to its log, would in fact result in 
perfect collinearity.) 
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within countries (Table 5, first panel).  By contrast, increases in the duration of the chief 
executive's leadership in democracies (DEXDUR) are associated with significant improvement in 
only one of the six (CREDIT), with DEXDUR's coefficient taking on the wrong sign in four cases 
(see third panel of Table 5).  Table 6 presents marginal effects for duration values as estimated 
from Table 5 regressions, for changes in duration from 2 to 10 years, and from 10 to 25 years.
29
 
                               
29
  We do not calculate predicted values because of the differing country intercepts. 
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By pooling the autocratic and democratic observations, and constructing an interaction 
term equal to the autocracy dummy multiplied by the duration of the chief executive, we can test 
whether differences between autocracies and democracies in the impact of leader duration on 
property rights are statistically significant.  Coefficients on these interaction terms indicate that 
more time in power for an autocrat improves property and contract rights more than does a longer 
time in office for a democratic leader; the interactions are highly significant for CIM and the BERI 
index, and significant at .05 or .06 levels for ICRG, DEPREC, and PREMIUM.
30
  These results 
strongly support the theory that the duration of leaders affects property and contact rights in 
autocracies but not in democracies. 
Our theory would also predict that the time in power of "almost" autocrats -- category II in 
our classification -- would matter less than the duration of less-constrained autocrats (in most 
cases, the presence of a partially effective legislature is what differentiates the category I from 
category II leaders).  Results from tests using Table 5 specifications, but with autocrats and 
almost autocrats separated, strongly support this prediction.  For the sample of relatively 
unconstrained autocrats, the AUTDUR coefficient is significant in all five cases in which it was 
significant in the first panel of Table 5; in most cases the coefficient is larger in absolute value (see 
Table 7).  For the relatively constrained autocrats, coefficients attain the right sign only in CIM, 
BERI, and PREMIUM equations, with only CIM significant. 
                               
30
  Results not shown in tables, but are available on request. 
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Property rights appear to deteriorate with increasing life of democratic systems (Table 5, 
fourth panel).  The unexpected results here on the duration of democracy are largely the product 
of a few long-lasting democracies which were replaced by reform-minded autocracies, but then 
returned to democracy during our sample period.  Chile, Uruguay, and Turkey are the most 
notable examples of this phenomenon.  For each of these countries, a few high DEMDUR values 
are coupled with poor property rights at the outset of our sample period, and a few very low 
DEMDUR values are coupled with much improved property rights at the end of the period.  In 
these cases, the improvements in property rights and policies over the period are primarily 
attributable to the reform-minded autocratic regimes.  These countries heavily influence the 
coefficient: for DEMDUR for the sample as a whole, despite the fact that the inverse correlation 
between DEMDUR and property rights measures within these countries is produced by an 
interruption of democracy by autocratic rule.  Deleting these three regime-switching countries 
dramatically weakens the perverse findings for DEMDUR in the CIM and BERI equations in 
Table 5.  A similar weakening of those findings is obtained by using a fixed-effects test that 
substitutes regime dummies for country dummies.
31
  The Table 5 coefficients on DEMDUR, 
therefore, do not reflect an actual deterioration in property and contract rights when a given 
democratic regime lasts longer. 
 
6. Endogeneity of Regime Duration 
                               
31
  Recall that within a democratic regime, DEMDUR always increases: DEMDUR reverts to a value of 1 
only when a new democratic regime replaces a non-democratic regime.  Interruptions in democracy by spells of 
autocratic rule thus cannot influence the DEMDUR coefficient when regime intercepts are included. 
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The time in power of autocrats is conceivably endogenous to economic performance.  
Previous studies have found coup probabilities to be negatively related to recent growth rates 
(Alesina et al., 1993; Londregan and Poole, 1991)
32
 and income levels (Londregan and Poole, 
1991).  The coefficient of AUTDUR could be biased upwards if property rights improve 
economic performance, which in turn improves an autocrat's survival probability and thereby 
increases AUTDUR.  Another possibility is that increases in income add to autocrat duration and 
improve property rights, creating a spurious association between the latter two variables.  Our 
regressions control for current income levels, however.  In specifications not reported in our 
tables, AUTDUR coefficients are found to be unaffected by the inclusion of growth over the 
previous year as an additional regressor.
33
 
If autocratic leaders behave in the same way as do governmental leaders in the Grossman 
and Noh model, property rights could influence AUTDUR independently of the impact of property 
rights on economic performance.  Though in our model higher rent extraction by an autocrat 
provides more resources to maintain his hold on power, on the alternative interpretation a lower 
extraction of rent from the populace would improve an autocrat's survival probability directly, and 
thus generate a reverse causation from property rights to duration. 
If such reverse causation were driving our results, we would expect duration in the 
following period to explain current property rights better than duration in the previous period.  
We introduced one-year lags and, alternatively, one-year leads of duration into our fixed-effects 
                               
32
  Alesina et al. (1993) find, however, that the probability of government changes and of "major" 
government changes (both of which include coups as one type of government change) is unaffected by recent 
economic performance. 
33
  Growth in most cases is not a significant predictor of property rights.  These results are available on 
request. 
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regressions of property rights on autocrat duration.  Neither leads nor lags performed as well as 
contemporaneous duration, although differences were not dramatic.  Neither lags nor leads 
clearly performed better than the other one, either.  These findings offer no support for the view 
that our results are primarily capturing reverse causation. 
A second piece of evidence against reverse causation is that the coefficient on AUTDUR in 
most cases exceeds the coefficient on DEXDUR, the duration of democratic leaders.  A plausible 
assumption is that the time in power of chief executives in democracies, as compared to 
autocracies, is more sensitive to their choice of policies: indeed, this sensitivity to short-term 
electoral pressures is commonly cited as a disadvantage of democracy.  Thus, the endogeneity 
objection outlined above should apply as strongly, or more strongly, to the time in office of 
democratic leaders.  Therefore, if reverse causation from property rights to time in power were 
the primary force driving our results, coefficients for DEXDUR should exceed those for 
AUTDUR.  For five of the six dependent variables in Table 5, however, coefficients for 
DEXDUR and AUTDUR indicate a stronger link between duration and property rights for 
autocratic leaders than for democratic leaders, as reported in more detail above.  Again, no 
evidence for reverse causation is found. 
Finally, we also attempted to correct for endogeneity by instrumenting for AUTDUR, 
despite our skepticism concerning the appropriateness of available instruments.  The two 
instruments used were age of the autocrat at the time of accession,
34
 and completed duration of the 
                               
34
  Age is a highly imperfect measure of the time horizons relevant to policy choices by autocrats, for reasons 
discussed earlier in the paper. 
 
 
46 
previous autocrat.
35
  As neither of these instruments varies by year, we use them only in the 
country-regime regressions of property rights on AUTDUR.  Results using instrumented values 
of AUTDUR were mixed.  Recall that in Table 3 AUTDUR had the predicted sign in all six 
regressions.  Coefficients for instrumented values of AUTDUR are greater in absolute value in 
four of these six cases, including each of the three cases (ICRG, CREDIT, and DEPREC) in which 
AUTDUR was significant in Table 3.  Only in the case of DEPREC -- and of CIM, which reverses 
sign -- is the instrumented value of AUTDUR statistically significant, however.  In all six cases, 
standard errors are several times higher than in Table 3, due in part to reductions in sample size 
attributable to missing data on the instruments, but primarily to the relatively poor explanatory 
power of the instruments. 
 
7. Heterogeneity of Autocrats 
Our results on AUTDUR are conceivably an artifact of omitted-variable bias associated 
with heterogeneity (sample selection) of autocrats.  As a simple example, suppose that autocrats 
attaining power come in two types, "skilled" and "unskilled," with equal numbers in each group.  
Assume further that for each group, there is a constant hazard of deposition by coup in each period, 
and that this constant rate is substantially higher for the unskilled group, as depicted by the two 
horizontal lines of Figure 1.  Autocrats know to which group they belong, and perceive a constant 
low or high hazard rate over time, depending on whether they are skilled or unskilled.  The overall 
                               
35
  Where there was no previous autocrat, as in the newly-independent African nations, we used the average 
of completed duration for the initial autocrats of "similar" countries.  For example, we used the average completed 
duration of all other initial autocrats in formerly-British African colonies as the instrument for AUTDUR for Uganda's 
first autocrat.  Age was highly significant (t = 4.70) but previous duration only marginally significant (t = 1.64) in 
explaining AUTDUR.  The R
2
 was only .12. 
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hazard rate for any given value of duration will be a weighted average of the rates for the two 
separate groups.  In t = 1, the overall hazard will be exactly halfway between that for each of the 
two groups, since they are represented in equal numbers at t = 1.  After that time, however, as 
higher attrition in the unskilled group implies that the ratio of skilled to unskilled leaders rises, in 
each subsequent year the weighted average rate of hazard will be increasingly close to the lower 
hazard rate of the skilled group. 
In observing only the overall hazard rate, we attribute increasing horizons to leaders that 
survive longer in power, and hypothesize an improvement in property rights.  Yet, each autocrat 
perceives only one of the two constant hazard rates, and thus does not feel more secure in power as 
his time in power lengthens.  A consequence of heterogeneity is that it potentially makes tenure to 
date an inappropriate proxy for time horizons.  Any correlation between time in power and 
property rights may be spurious if duration has little or no relationship to the "true" time horizons 
perceived by autocrats. 
We believe the decline in hazard rates as the time in power of an autocrat lengthens is more 
than an artifact of sample selection.  First, the concept of consolidation of power is difficult to 
argue against.  Second, "skill" is only one of many factors determining who stays in power.
36
  
Third, some of the most important possible sources of unobserved heterogeneity may cancel each 
other out: hereditary succession may enhance a leader's legitimacy, yet his other "skills" may be 
inferior to those of a leader rising to power on his own.  Note it is not necessarily true that 
unobserved heterogeneity would bias the coefficient of AUTDUR upward.  "Charisma" may help 
                               
36
  "Examples abound of leaders who were considered "smart" or "skilled" but who did not hold power very 
long, such as Kofi Busia in Ghana and Sylvanus Olympio in Togo." (Bienen and van de Walle, 1991, p. 6). 
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a leader to stay in office, but if that charisma is based in part on an ideology antagonistic to 
markets, increases in an autocrat's time in power will be associated with deteriorating property 
rights.  In any event, we correct for this potential problem of heterogeneity, finding that the 
positive impact of autocrat duration on property rights is robust to these corrections. 
Our test is borrowed from the Abraham and Farber (1987) study of the impact of seniority 
on wages.  The long duration and favorable property-rights policies of some autocrats are 
conceivably both products of some omitted autocrat-specific characteristic, such as superior 
"skills."  In principle, we could include autocrat dummies in our fixed effects tests.  Collinearity 
of duration with time and income made these very demanding tests, however. 
Abraham and Farber faced a similar problem in attempting to control for unobserved 
worker skills and worker-job "match" in time-series cross-sectional regressions of wages on 
seniority and experience.  They could not estimate job-specific effects because changes in 
seniority and experience over time were perfectly collinear within a given job.  As an alternative, 
they included as an additional regressor completed job duration, as a proxy of these unobserved 
characteristics. 
Analogously, we include terminal duration in a time-series cross-section model without 
country- or autocrat-specific intercepts.  For each country-year observation, TERMDUR equals 
the (log of) duration of the autocrat in his final year in power.  Unmeasured skills of autocrats 
formerly captured by AUTDUR are hence captured by TERMDUR instead. 
The addition of TERMDUR has relatively little effect on the results for AUTDUR (see 
Table 8, where column 1 equations do not contain TERMDUR but column 2 equations do).  
TERMDUR has the positive sign implied by the sample selection objection in only four of six 
 
 
49 
cases and is never significant.  AUTDUR retains the expected sign in five of six cases (all but 
ICRG), with the coefficient rising substantially in two cases (CIM and BERI).  Property rights are 
generally found to improve with autocrat duration, independently of autocrat skills, as measured 
by differences in terminal duration. 
 
8. Additional Robustness Tests 
The ranges of several of the dependent variables -- both objective and subjective -- are 
limited.  Most notably, CIM is bounded by 0 and 1, while CREDIT is bounded by 0 and 100.  
Using OLS on these variables could lead to predicted values outside these bounds.  In fact, very 
few predicted values violated these bounds.  Re-estimating all CIM and CREDIT equations using 
logistic transformations of CIM and of CREDIT/100, constraining the predicted values to the 0-1 
interval, yielded results very similar to those reported in the tables. 
Each fixed-effects regression was re-run using corrections for autocorrelation.  All 
duration effects that were statistically significant in the tables reported here remained significant.  
Random-effects specifications were also run.  In these tests, duration of autocrat leader 
significantly improved values on all six dependent variables; AUTDUR was not a significant 
predictor of CREDIT in the fixed-effects results of Table 5.  A Hausman test rejects the 
random-effects specification in favor of the fixed-effects specification, however. 
The country-regime units cover widely-varying periods: some last less than one year while 
others cover 30 or more years.  Accordingly, we re-ran all country-regime tests reported in Tables 
1 and 3 weighting observations by the (square root of) duration of the regime.  Results on the 
regime type and duration variables vary somewhat from OLS, but not in a consistent direction, and 
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lead to similar conclusions.  Furthermore, the error variance of the unweighted regressions is 
generally uncorrelated with regime duration.  We therefore report OLS rather than WLS results in 
our tables.  All standard errors reported in tables are White-corrected (1980). 
 
9. Conclusions 
We began with a theory of the incentives and constraints that explain property and 
contracts rights in autocracies and in democracies.  We argued that a secure autocrat with a long 
time horizon has an incentive to respect and protect property and contract rights in his domain 
because this increases the future income of his domain and thus also his tax collections.  By 
contrast, an autocrat who, because of an insecure hold on power or any other reason, has a 
sufficiently short time horizon will find that the tax yield from any asset over that short time 
horizon is less than the value of the capital good, so that he is rational to seize any easily 
confiscable assets. 
In democracies, we argued, property and contract rights arise from a dramatically different 
set of incentives and constraints.  There is no reason why the election that initiates a democracy 
should bring good property and contract rights.  Democracies often emerge in unsettled and 
sometimes even somewhat anarchic conditions that are unfavorable to the protection of property 
rights and the new democracies may not be strong enough to protect these rights.  Even if the 
leadership of the new elected government is powerful, there is no assurance that property rights 
will be secure, for this democratic government may not last long, and one of the prominent 
possibilities is that the democratically elected leader will become a dictator. 
By contrast, it is not feasible for a long-lasting democracy to prohibit all forms of private 
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property and contracting: the same adherence to the rule-of-law and protections for individual 
freedoms that are needed to maintain free elections in which any defeated incumbents step down, 
entail that there are some property rights -- the individuals in a free society have what James 
Madison called "a property in their rights."  Thus we hypothesized that long-lasting democracies 
generally provide better property and contract rights than either transient democracies or 
autocracies. 
Our empirical evidence supports our hypotheses.  We found that autocrats who had been 
in power longer and who by our argument had reason to have longer time horizons were associated 
with better property and contract rights than autocrats who were in power only for a shorter time.  
We also found that, in general, democracies provide greater security of property and contractual 
rights than autocracies.  But these benefits of democracy did not appear quickly: the property and 
contract rights were often poor in democracies that had lasted only a short time.  Among the 
relatively small group of countries within our sample that moved from one regime type to another, 
the security of property and contract rights was greater while they were autocracies than while they 
were democracies.  We found, by contrast, that long-lasting democracies offer better protection 
for property and contract rights than any other regime type of any duration. 
Our results also show that, as our theory predicted, the duration of democratic systems 
matters much more than the duration of democratic leaders for property and contract rights.  
Moreover, we found that, after controlling for country effects, the security of property rights is 
more sensitive to changes in the time in power of autocratic leaders than to the time in office of 
democratic leaders. 
We conclude that statistical tests of economic performance under autocracies and 
democracies that leave out the hypotheses that we have developed and tested are mis-specified.  It 
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is only natural, given our theory and our empirical results, that the comparisons of economic 
performance under autocracies and democracies have been so varied and inconclusive.  It is, we 
argue, just as important in the analysis of government and politics as in the analysis of market 
behavior to analyze the incentives and constraints that face the individuals involved.  Such an 
analysis suggests that property and contract rights in democracies and autocracies have utterly 
different sources, and our empirical results show that this is true. 
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 Appendix 
 The Gurr-Banks Annual Scheme 
 
BASIC VARIABLES 
 
2.2 XRCOMP.  (from Gurr) 
00. This unnamed category applies to situations in which power transfers are coded "unregulated" 
in variable 2.1 or involve a transition to/from unregulated. 
1. Selection of chief exec. [hereditary succession, or rigged elections, or by coups, or by military 
designation, or repeated incumbent selection of successors] 
2. Dual/transitional [Dual means there are two executives, one chosen by hereditary succession, 
the other by competitive election.  Also used for transitional arrangements between selection and 
election.] 
3. Election of chief exec [competitive election] 
 
9.7 EXSELEC  (from Banks) 
1. Direct election 
2. Indirect election 
3. Nonelective 
 
9.12 LEGEF, Legislative Effectiveness (Banks) 
0. None 
1. Ineffective: either rubber stamp, or domestic turmoil makes the implementation of legislation 
impossible, or the effective executive prevents the legislature from meeting or substantially 
impedes the exercise of its function. 
2. Partially effective.  A situation in which the effective executive's power substantially 
outweighs but does not completely dominate that of the legislature. 
3. Effective.  Possession of significant governmental autonomy by the legislature. 
 
Classifications are:  
1. Dictator (DI) 
2. Almost Dictator (AD) 
3. Intermediate category (I) 
4. Almost Democracy (AD) 
5. Democracy (DE) 
EMPTY = category predicted to be empty (EM) 
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 Regime Type Classification 
 Based on LEGEF and XRCOMP*  
 
 
 
 
LEGEF 
 
 
X 
R 
C 
O 
M 
P 
 
 
 
0,1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
0,1 
 
I 
 
II 
 
 
 
2 
 
II 
 
III 
 
IV 
 
3 
 
III 
 
IV 
 
V 
 
*Where Banks' EXSELEC is inconsistent with  
Gurr's XRCOMP, we code the regime a III, as  
described in the text.  
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 Table 1 
 Regime Type and Property Rights 
  Country-Regimes Cross-Sectional Regressions
a
 
   
Dependent variable: 
Indep. var.: 
CIM ICRG 
Index 
BERI 
Index 
Credit 
Risk 
Currency 
Deprec. 
Black  
market 
premium 
Intercept -0.057 
(0.067) 
-25.154 
  (9.255) 
-7.023 
(2.245) 
-84.239 
(17.422) 
-0.011 
(0.096) 
1.119 
(0.258) 
Log (income)  0.101* 
(0.008) 
  5.567* 
(0.779) 
 1.950* 
(0.198) 
19.772*  
(1.569) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
 -0.136*  
(0.048) 
Time  
 
 .0047* 
(.0013) 
   0.610 
  (0.353) 
-0.022  
(0.053) 
 -1.849*  
(0.424) 
.0049* 
(.0021) 
0.019* 
(0.006) 
Autocracy -0.051* 
(0.015) 
 -5.995*  
(1.652) 
-0.446 
 (0.505) 
-5.687 
(3.340) 
0.020 
(0.025) 
 0.063 
(0.071) 
Adj. R
2
  .50 .57 
 
  .50 
   
.71 .02 
 
.09 
N 240  137 
  
 93 133 223 217 
 
   Table entries are regression coefficients, with White-corrected standard errors  
   in parentheses.  A * indicates significance at .05 or better, 2-tailed tests.  
                               
     aAutocracy dummy = 1 for regime types I and II, = 0 for regime types IV and V.   
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Table 2 
 Regime Type and Property Rights 
  Fixed-Effects Regressions
a
 
   
Dep. variable: 
  
Indep. variable: 
CIM ICRG 
Index 
BERI 
Index 
CREDIT 
 
DEPREC PREMIUM 
Log (income)    0.089*  
(0.008) 
  0.922    
(0.960)  
   1.815*  
(0.217) 
 35.054   
(1.760) 
 -0.188*  
(0.017) 
 -0.522*  
(0.070) 
Autocracy 
 
 0.015* 
(0.005) 
   0.173       
(0.508)    
0.446*  
 (0.114) 
-0.148 
(1.015) 
 -0.047*  
(0.011) 
-0.069  
(0.045) 
R
2
  .92 .97    .93   .97 .62 .53 
N 1977 
 
 768 812  951 1828 1612 
   
 * indicates significance at .05 or better.   
                               
     aAutocracy dummy = 1 for regime types I and II, = 0 for regime types IV and V.  Additional regressors include year and country dummies.   
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Table 3 
 Regime Duration and Property Rights 
 Summary of Country-Regimes Cross-Sectional Regressions
a
 
   
Sample 
(Duration variable) 
 Autocrats 
 (AUTDUR) 
 Autocrat Groups 
 (AUTGROUP) 
 Democrat Regimes 
 (DEMDUR) 
 Democrat Leaders  
 (DEXDUR) 
 B  
(SE) 
 Adj. R
2
  
N 
B 
 (SE) 
Adj. R
2 
N 
B  
(SE) 
Adj. R
2
  
N 
B  
(SE) 
Adj. R
2
  
N 
Contract-Intensive Money 
(CIM) 
   0.007   
(0.008) 
  .34    
   174     
0.010 
(0.009) 
.30 
131 
0.018 
(0.011) 
.58 
 66 
.0087 
(.0045) 
.54 
248 
Int'l Country Risk Guide 
Index (ICRG) 
   1.351*   
(0.524) 
   .10     
 84  
 2.398* 
(0.433) 
.21 
 71 
  5.303* 
(1.142) 
.81 
 53 
0.764 
(0.850) 
.69 
111 
Business Environmental 
Risk Intelligence Index 
   0.240   
(0.154) 
.31  
   53     
 0.486* 
(0.165) 
.36 
 34 
   0.854*  
(0.269) 
.69 
 40 
0.416*  
(0.154) 
.59 
157 
Institutional Investor 
Credit Rating  
 2.446* 
(1.122) 
  .61    
   83    
 3.939* 
(1.014) 
.64 
 65 
    1.503      
(4.636)  
.70 
   50  
1.310 
(1.583) 
.63 
147 
Currency Depreciation  -0.025*  
(0.010) 
.05 
155 
-0.018 
(0.011) 
.01 
117 
 -0.047*  
  (0.022)  
.12 
 68 
-0.026* 
(0.010) 
.08 
244 
Black Market Currency 
Exchange Premium 
  -0.054   
(0.038) 
 .12 
 169 
-0.026 
(0.039) 
.07 
126 
-0.073 
(0.072) 
.08 
 48 
0.004 
(0.022) 
.03 
141 
   
 A * indicates significance at .05 or better.     
                               
     aTable entries show coefficients and (White-corrected) standard errors for duration variables.  The duration variable is the log of the number of years the 
regime lasts, where the regime is defined in terms of the chief executive's tenure in the "autocracy" and "democratic leader" samples, and in terms of the number of 
continuous years in which democracy has been in place in the "democratic regimes" sample.  Independent variables in addition to regime duration include the log 
of per capita income and time (= year - 1969).                 
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Table 4: Predicted Values of Property Rights Variables (from Table 3 regressions)     
  Duration and Income Values 
 
Dependent 
variable 
 
Regime 
Type 
2 10 25 
  500 2500 5000 500 2500 5000 500 2500 5000 
CIM 
 
 
Aut (L) 
Aut (G) 
Dem (L) 
Dem (R) 
 .553 
 .555 
 .689 
 .672 
  .734 
 .720 
 .804 
 .766 
 .812 
 .791 
 .853 
 .806 
 .564 
 .572 
 .703 
 .701 
.745 
.736 
.818 
.795 
 .823 
 .807 
 .867 
 .835 
 .570 
 .581 
 .711 
 .718 
.751 
.746 
.826 
.812 
 .830 
 .817 
 .875 
 .852 
ICRG 
Index 
 
Aut (L) 
Aut (G) 
Dem (L) 
Dem (R) 
 13.51 
11.64 
 7.66 
-4.74 
 16.67 
13.94 
 24.85 
  6.30 
 18.03 
14.93 
32.26 
 11.05 
15.68 
15.50 
 8.89 
 3.80 
18.84 
17.80 
26.08 
14.83 
20.21 
18.79 
33.49 
19.58 
16.92 
17.69 
 9.59 
 8.66 
20.08 
20.00 
26.78 
19.69 
21.44 
20.99 
34.19 
24.44 
BERI 
Index 
Aut (L) 
Aut (G) 
Dem (L) 
Dem (R) 
 5.35 
 5.37 
 3.46 
 1.56 
 7.37 
 6.57 
  7.51 
     5.12    
 8.23 
 7.08 
 9.26 
 6.65 
 5.74 
 6.16 
 4.13 
 2.94 
7.75 
7.35 
8.18 
6.49 
 8.62 
 7.86 
 9.93 
 8.02 
 5.96 
 6.60 
 4.51 
 3.72 
7.97 
7.79 
8.56 
7.27 
 8.84 
 8.31 
10.31 
 8.80 
Credit 
Risk   
Aut (L) 
Aut (G) 
Dem (L) 
Dem (R) 
10.31 
  8.80 
  4.46 
23.24 
 37.74 
31.77 
  43.57  
  58.52  
 49.55 
 41.67 
 60.41 
73.72 
14.25 
15.14 
 6.57 
25.66 
41.68 
38.11 
45.68 
60.94 
53.49 
48.01 
62.52 
76.14 
16.49 
18.75 
 7.77 
27.04 
43.92 
41.72 
46.88 
62.32 
55.73 
51.62 
63.72 
77.52 
Currency  
Depreciation 
Aut (L) 
Aut (G) 
Dem (L) 
Dem (R) 
 .151 
 .145 
 .236 
 .214 
 .188 
 .178 
 .175 
 .236 
 .204 
  .192 
  .149 
 .245 
 .111 
 .116 
 .194 
 .139 
.148 
.149 
.133 
.161 
 .164 
 .164 
 .107 
 .170 
 .088 
 .100 
 .170 
 .096 
.125 
.133 
.110 
.118 
 .141 
 .147 
 .084 
 .127 
Black Market 
Premium 
 
 
Aut (L) 
Aut (G) 
Dem (L) 
Dem (R) 
  .608 
 .514 
 .373 
 .528 
 .389 
 .377 
 .238 
 .402 
 .295 
 .319 
 .180 
 .347 
 .521 
 .473 
 .379 
 .410 
.303 
.336 
.244 
.283 
 .209 
 .277 
 .186 
 .229 
 .472 
 .449 
 .382 
 .343 
.253 
.313 
.248 
.216 
 .159 
 .254 
 .190 
 .162 
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Table 5 
 Regime Duration and Property Rights 
 Fixed-Effects Models 
   
Sample  Autocrats  Autocrat Groups  Democrat Leaders  Democratic Regimes 
 
Dependent variable: 
B 
 (SE) 
R
2
  
N 
B 
  (SE) 
R
2
 
N 
B 
 (SE) 
R
2 
N
 
B 
  (SE) 
R
2
  
N 
Contract-Intensive Money 
(CIM) 
   0.013*  
(0.002) 
   .89    
1082  
 0.014* 
(0.003) 
.89 
1082 
-.0012 
(.0015) 
.86 
895 
-0.016* 
(0.002) 
.86 
895 
International Country  
Risk Guide Index (ICRG) 
  0.499*  
(0.162) 
   .93      
394  
 0.818* 
(0.215) 
.93 
394 
 0.112 
(0.169) 
.98 
374 
 0.430 
(0.481) 
.98 
374 
Business Environmental 
Risk Intelligence Index 
   0.574*  
(0.076) 
 .82  
  275   
 0.992* 
(0.100) 
.84 
275 
-0.017 
(0.038) 
.96 
537 
-0.366* 
(0.061) 
.96 
537 
Institutional Investor 
Credit Rating  
0.553 
(0.387) 
   .93   
 440 
 1.721* 
(0.550) 
.93 
440 
 0.689* 
(0.280) 
.98 
511 
 0.906  
  (0.677)   
.98 
511 
Currency Depreciation  -0.015*  
(0.005) 
.58 
943 
-0.009 
(0.005) 
.57 
943 
.0043 
(.0037) 
.77 
885 
 0.014* 
  (0.006)   
.77 
885 
Black Market Currency 
Exchange Premium 
 -0.057*  
(0.018) 
 .56 
1099 
-0.077* 
(0.020) 
.56 
1099 
.0064 
(.0166) 
.42 
513 
 0.078* 
(0.020) 
.44 
513 
   
   Independent variables in addition to regime duration include per capita income, year dummies, and  
   country dummies.  A * indicates significance at .05 or better.             
  
 
 
Table 6: Marginal Effects of Duration 
 on Property Rights Variables (from Table 5 regressions) 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Regime 
Type 
 Duration Values 
  2 10 25 
CIM 
 
Aut (L) 
Aut (G) 
Dem (L) 
Dem (R) 
 0 
 0 
 0 
 0 
 .021 
 .023 
-.001 
-.011 
 .034 
 .035 
-.001 
 .016 
ICRG 
 
Aut (L) 
Aut (G) 
Dem (L) 
Dem (R) 
 0 
 0 
 0 
 0 
 0.80 
 1.31 
 0.08 
 0.30 
 1.26 
 2.06 
 0.13 
 0.47 
BERI  
 
Aut (L) 
Aut (G) 
Dem (L) 
Dem (R) 
 0 
 0 
 0 
 0 
 0.92 
 1.60 
-0.01 
-0.26 
 1.45 
 2.51 
 -0.02 
-0.40 
CREDIT 
   
Aut (L) 
Aut (G) 
Dem (L) 
Dem (R) 
 0 
 0 
 0 
 0 
0.89 
2.77 
0.49 
0.63 
 1.39 
 4.34 
 0.76 
 0.99 
DEPREC Aut (L) 
Aut (G) 
Dem (L) 
Dem (R) 
 0 
 0 
 0 
 0 
-.023 
-.015 
 .003 
 .011 
 -.037 
-.024 
 .004 
 .016 
PREMIUM Aut (L) 
Aut (G) 
Dem (L) 
Dem (R) 
 0 
 0 
 0 
 0 
-.092 
-.124 
 .004 
 .054 
-.145 
-.194 
 .006 
 .086 
       
             Aut(L) = Autocratic Leader; Aut(G) = Autocratic Group 
             Dem(L) = Democratic Leader; Dem(R) = Democratic Regime
 
 
Table 7 
 Regime Duration and Property Rights 
 Fixed-Effects Models for Autocrats and Near-Autocrats 
   
Sample  Autocrats  
 (Regime Type I) 
 Near-Autocrats 
 (Regime Type II) 
 
Dependent variable: 
B 
 (SE) 
R
2
  
N 
B 
  (SE) 
R
2
 
N 
Contract-Intensive Money 
(CIM) 
   0.013*  
(0.003) 
   .88     
883  
 0.012* 
(0.004) 
.94 
 199 
International Country  
Risk Guide Index (ICRG) 
  0.784*  
(0.187) 
   .92      
319  
 -0.119  
(0.420) 
.95 
 75 
Business Environmental 
Risk Intelligence Index 
   0.790*  
(0.110) 
 .80  
  182  
 0.077  
(0.090) 
.93 
 93 
Institutional Investor 
Credit Rating  
-0.023 
(0.462) 
   .93   
 344 
 -0.218  
(0.670) 
.96 
 96 
Currency Depreciation  -0.013*  
(0.005) 
.61 
757 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
.71 
186 
Black Market Currency 
Exchange Premium 
 -0.064*  
(0.021) 
 .55 
 903 
 0.022  
(0.023) 
.84 
 196 
   
    Independent variables in addition to regime duration include per capita income, year dummies, and  
    country dummies.  A * indicates significance at .05 or better.      
 
 
Table 8 
 Regime Duration and Property Rights 
 Terminal Duration of Autocrats in Time-Series Cross-Section Tests 
   
Sample  Autocrats  
 Equation  1 Equation 2 
Independent variable AUTDUR AUTDUR TERMDUR 
 
Dependent variable: 
B 
 (SE) 
B 
  (SE) 
B 
(SE) 
Contract-Intensive Money 
(CIM) 
   0.011*  
(0.004) 
 0.019* 
(0.007) 
-0.013 
 (0.008) 
International Country  
Risk Guide Index (ICRG) 
  0.481   
(0.307) 
 -0.646   
(0.775) 
 1.571 
  (0.992)  
Business Environmental 
Risk Intelligence Index 
   0.340*  
(0.101) 
 0.487* 
(0.175) 
-0.214 
 (0.207) 
Institutional Investor 
Credit Rating  
 2.238* 
(0.565) 
  1.199  
(1.178) 
1.499 
(1.482) 
Currency Depreciation  -0.023*  
(0.004) 
-0.013 
(0.008) 
-0.014 
 (0.010) 
Black Market Currency 
Exchange Premium 
 -0.073*  
(0.018) 
 -0.066*  
(0.033) 
-0.011 
 (0.040) 
   
     Independent variables in addition to regime duration variables include  
     per capita income, and year dummies.  A * indicates significance at .05  
     or better.                 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
